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Conditionals, modality, and Schrödinger’s cat:  





1. Motivation and aims 
 
According to Fillmore (1986: 163), conditionals have “a topmost bipartite structure” while 
“defining a single situation” (ibid.: 171). They consist of the protasis (P), in which a condition 
is expressed, and the apodosis (A), in which a comment related to the condition in the protasis 
is provided (Fillmore 1986, Sweetser 1990: 125, Dancygier 1998, Dancygier & Sweetser 2005). 
A large number of studies have proposed that there is a close connection between conditionality 
and modality. Comrie (1986: 89) claims that a conditional “never expresses the factuality of 
either of its constituent propositions”. Palmer (1986: 189) comments that “modality seems […] 
to be doubly marked in conditionals”. More precisely, Dancygier (1998: 72) states that “the 
presence of if in the construction marks the assumption in its scope as unassertable. As a result, 
the assumption in the apodosis, which belongs to the same mental space as the protasis, is not 
treated as asserted either” (see also Bybee et al. 1994: 208). Nuyts (2001: 352) reports that 
“conditionals have an intimate link with the domain of epistemic qualification”. Huddleston & 
Pullum (2002: 741) state that “If P (then) Q is a weaker statement that Q on its own”, adding 
that “the conditional construction is conducive to the expression of modality” (ibid.: 744). 
Similarly, Turner (2003: 135) presents the intuitive view that “conditionals are not part of fact-
stating discourse: conditionals, instead, express uncertainties”.  
 
More recently, corpus-based studies have provided empirical evidence for the connection 
between conditionals and modality, showing that conditionals in general, and if-conditionals in 
particular, contain have a higher modal load (i.e. contain modal marking much more frequently) 
than average, and even higher than non-conditional structures (Gabrielatos 2007, 2010, 2011a, 
2011b, 2013, 2019). The high modal load (henceforth, ML) of conditionals is made all the more 
intriguing when we consider that their protases are already within the modalising scope of their 
subordinators (e.g. assuming, if, unless), or the modal markers introducing conditionals without 
overt subordinators (e.g. Should you require assistance, …) – the modal marking of which was 
not included in the calculation of the ML. Examined through the lens of Lexical Grammar 
(Sinclair 1996, 2004), conditionals have been described as “modal colligations”, that is, 
grammatical structures with a strong mutual attraction to the semantic category of modality 
(Gabrielatos 2007). 
 
It has also been argued that the meaning of the construction itself influences the meaning of its 
constituent parts (Fillmore 1986: 164, Goldberg 1995: 10-11, 16, Goldberg & Jackendoff 2004: 
534, Tomasello 2003: 161). In particular, Fillmore (1986: 170) observed that “tense forms and 
the perfect and modal auxiliaries have roles in conditional sentences which differ in important 
ways from what can be said about them when they occur in self-standing sentences”. Evidence 
for this has been provided in Gabrielatos (2003, 2006): the manual analysis of two random 
samples of if-conditionals in the written BNC revealed that past tense marking in protases has 
modal meaning, in that it expresses remoteness in likelihood, much more often than it denotes 
remoteness in time (about two thirds of the instances). In contrast, in the random sample of 857 
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non-conditional constructions from the written BNC examined in Gabrielatos (2010) no such 
uses were found; all past tense markings referred to past time. Of course, this does not 
necessarily entail that modally remote uses of the past tense never occur outside conditionals, 
but rather that they are rare, or, more precisely, significantly less frequent than within 
conditional constructions. 
 
However, the above findings do not, in themselves, explain the nature of the connection of 
conditionals to modality. Therefore, this chapter will address the following interrelated 
questions: Can conditionals be seen as being modalising structures themselves? Can they 
simply be seen as being internally modalised? Or is their nature more complex and intriguing? 
This chapter is also motivated by the corpus-based findings of Gabrielatos (2010, 2011a, 2011b, 
2013, 2019), which indicated that conditionals can be more usefully treated as constructions 
(Fillmore 1986: 196, 1998: 36). Therefore, the above questions will be addressed through the 
lens of Construction Grammar, while the discussion will also draw on the notion of mental 
spaces (Fauconnier 1994), as adapted for the examination of conditionals in Dancygier & 
Sweetser (2005).  
 
2. The modal nature of conditionals: considerations 
 
It would be helpful to start by examining the distinction between modalised constructions and 
modal constructions, as although the two terms are defined in the literature, they have not been 
contrasted. A modalised construction is modified by one or more modal markers (e.g. 
Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 173), in that the modal marking indicates how likely, potential, or 
desirable the user wants to present its content. On the other hand, a modal construction can 
modalise (i.e. modally mark) other constructions (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985: 120-121). In this light, 
we can examine whether conditional constructions are simply modalised, or are themselves 
modal markers.  
 
The simplest observation is that conditionals can indeed be modalised by modal markers 
external to the construction, as (1) attests: the conditional is itself modalised by perhaps. The 
result of that external modalisation is that, even if the proposition in P is factual, it does not 
necessarily follow that the proposition in A holds. In (1), even when a patient is indeed ‘a bad 
case’, it is not presented as certain that they would need a special boot or iron braces.1 
 
 (1) Perhaps if it's a bad case the patient has to wear a special boot or keep the leg held 
straight with iron braces. [CHG 80] 
 
However, the external modalisation of conditionals is not the focus of the present study, nor 
has it been included in the calculation of ML in Gabrielatos (2010, 2019). More importantly, 
the observation that constructions can be modalised by other constructions is in itself neither 
novel nor intrinsically interesting. If we distinguish between construction-internal and 
construction-external modalisation, then conditionals can be better described as being internally 
modalised. Still, the question remains whether the heavy ML of conditionals, that is, the high 
level of modalisation within the construction, justifies considering conditionals to be modalised 
or modal constructions.  
 
Let us examine the nature of the modal characteristics of the component parts of conditionals 
in more detail, looking at the modal nature of the protasis and apodosis, as well as their 
 
1 Examples are from the random samples from the written BNC examined in Gabrielatos (2010, 2019, 
forthcoming) unless otherwise indicated.  
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connection in terms of meaning. Clearly, A is always modalised, as it is within the semantic 
scope of P, which has been seen as “the introduction to a hypothetical world” (Sweetser 1990: 
127). Regarding if-conditionals, Dancygier (1998: 72) states that “the presence of if in the 
construction marks the assumption in its scope as unassertable. As a result, the assumption in 
the apodosis, which belongs to the same mental space as the protasis, is not readable as asserted 
either”. However, A is not modal itself, as it does not modalise another construction. The fact 
that A may also be internally modalised (as in (2) below) is irrelevant at this point – although 
it is important for the discussion of conditionals as linguistic qubits (see section 4).  
 
(2) If you view any of these files without the parent application running, the contents 
may not be legible. [FT8 2840] 
 
What is important for the present discussion is that the factuality/actualisation of P does not 
necessarily point towards the factuality/actualisation of A. For example, in (2) above, viewing 
the files without the parent application running does not ensure the illegibility of the contents.  
Dancygier & Sweetser (2005: 53) argue that “if is not truly neutral in stance, but is 
indeterminate between a range of stances including almost everything except complete positive 
stance towards P or ~P”.2 However, Quirk at al. (1985: 1010) argue that, particularly when the 
time reference is to the present or future, the meaning of the protasis “may be merely one of 
negative expectation or assumption, the positive not being ruled out completely”. In that 
respect, it may be more useful to say that, by opting to use a conditional, a speaker/writer 
communicates an uncertain stance towards the content of both the protasis and the apodosis. 
That is, it is not that the possibility of a polar stance (i.e. either positive or negative) is rejected 
outright; rather, that the polar alternatives are merely seen as the two extremes in a range of, 
yet unresolved, probabilities.  
 
The case of P requires further attention, as we need to consider whether, in terms of meaning, 
if (or any conditional subordinator) should be seen as semantically external or internal to P. 
Support for treating the subordinator as semantically external to the protasis seems to come 
from its conception as a “space builder”, in that its “job is to prompt the set-up of a mental 
space” (Dancygier & Sweetser 2005: 29, 140, see also Dancygier 1998: 72). However, positing 
the subordinator as external to P does not aid generalising to all conditionals. This becomes 
evident when considering conditionals with protases in which conditionality is marked 
morphosyntactically rather than lexically (see Dancygier 1998: 188-192, Fillmore 1986: 169, 
1990: 140-141, Fortuin & Boogaart 2009: 642). For example, in (3) and (4), the marker of 
conditionality is the past perfect plus inversion, and the imperative, respectively.3  
 
(3) Had their remit been wider, they might well have discovered that many of the 
teachers' anxieties about LMS arose from a lack of faith in school-level decision-
making and a feeling of being somehow ‘outside’ the decision-making process: a 
‘victim’ of change rather than an agent of it. [B23 910] 
 
2 See also Bybee et al. (1994: 208), Comrie (1986: 79-80), Dancygier (1998: 72, 110), Dancygier & Sweetser 
(2005: 32, 45-49), Fillmore (1990: 140), Halliday (2004: 89, 354-356), Hoye (1997), Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 
117, 147-149, 172-175), Leech (2004: 14-16, 36-40, 116), Lyons (1977: 451-452, 769, 794, 805-806, 815, 820), 
Nuyts (2001: 29), Palmer (1986: 4-6, 97, 108-115, 126; 1987:44-46), Perkins (1983: 106-108), Sweetser (1990: 
127), Werth (1997: 250-252). 
3 The discussion of some examples needs to take into account relevant co-text, as it can provide helpful clues to 
the relevant context (Brown & Yule 1983: 22-23, 47, 59). Also, some examples contain conditionals that are not 
the focus of the analysis (i.e. not embedded within the conditional in focus), and are therefore treated as co-text. 
In such instances, the co-text will be indicated with a smaller size font, so that it is clear which conditional is the 




(4) If your camcorder is one of the new low-light models which can take pictures down to levels of 2 
lux, you could simply switch on the normal top lighting in your lounge and start recording some 
perfectly adequate pictures. For our present purpose, though, they would look rather flat and not 
very magical: try it and you'll probably agree. [CBP 691] 
 
Further support for treating the subordinator as internal to P seems to come from the conception 
of P as setting up a possible world (Bybee et al. 1994: 208) or a mental space (Dancygier & 
Sweetser 2005: 11, Fauconnier 1994: 31-32), which is tantamount to recognising P as a modal 
construction in itself (see also Dancygier 1998: 72, Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 741). For 
example, in (4), the second P (‘if other materials prove too expensive’) modalises a conditional 
construction (‘they could … rendering’).  
 
 (5) Sizes range from {list of dimensions}.They could be used for perimeter walls and the 
like if finished with a decorative rendering, if other materials prove too expensive. 
[CG5 1587] 
  
The issue of whether the subordinator should be seen as semantically internal or external to the 
protasis will be revisited in section 3.3. What is clear, however, is that, in either case, the 
subordinator is an integral part of the construction. In that respect, conditionals can be seen as 
being permanently modalised. Crucially, at least within the tenets of Construction Grammar, 
treating protases as non-assertive entails that the non-assertiveness can be expected to be 
formally marked (i.e. lexically and/or morphologically and/or syntactically)  ̶  this issue will be 
revisited in section 4.  
 
Finally, we need to consider the question of whether the modal nature of P renders conditionals 
modal constructions themselves. In order for the latter to be established, it must be shown that 
conditional constructions (rather than only their protases) can themselves modalise other 
constructions. However, this has not been mentioned in previous studies, nor was it observed 
in the corpus samples of conditionals examined in Gabrielatos (2010, 2019). It must also be 
noted that this is not the case even in conditionals embedded within other conditionals, as, in 
these cases, the embedded conditional construction is modalised only by the protasis of the 
other, not by the whole construction (Gabrielatos 2005, 2010). For example, in (6), the 
conditional in the parenthesis (‘notice if registered land’) is within the modal scope of the 
protasis of the other conditional (‘If the former … husband’). More accurately, the apodosis of 
the parenthetical conditional (‘notice’) is an alternative apodosis for the first protasis (‘If the 
former … husband’), which is itself also within the modal scope of the parenthetical protasis 
(‘if registered land’). 
 
(6) (b) Cancellation and registration at HM Land Registry: notices.  
If the former matrimonial home has been in the sole name of the husband, then on 
completion of the various transactions the Class F Land Charge (or notice if registered 
land) should be cancelled. [JXH 731] 
 
In light of Halliday’s (2004: 365) view of modality as “the intermediate ground between 
positive and negative polarity", the above observations support the view of conditionals as 
constructions of a modal nature.  
 
At this point we need to summarise the attributes of conditionals concerning modal marking:  




• They do not modalise other constructions. 
• The protasis modally marks the apodosis. 
• The protasis is internally modalised by the subordinator (e.g. if, in case) or other 
lexicogrammatical means. 
• They have a modal load that is significantly higher than average. 
• Past tense marking in conditionals (particularly in their protases) expresses modal 
meaning much more often than temporal meaning.  
 
Combined, the above attributes strongly indicate that merely describing conditionals as 
internally modalised constructions, or modal colligations (Gabrielatos 2007), does not reveal 
their full nature. Simply put, the riddle posed by the nature of conditionals is that they are 
internally modalised but not modal. The modal nature of conditionals proposed in this chapter 
will be discussed in sections 3 and 4, and the attributes listed above will be revisited in section 
5. 
 
3. Conditionals as linguistic qubits 
 
Given the indeterminacy that characterises conditionals, it will be argued here that our 
understanding of their nature can be enhanced if we draw parallels with quantum states, which 
are “constituted not only by a specification of the truth or falsity of some of the eventualities, 
but also by the specification of the probabilities of finding truth or falsity upon actualisation of 
all the other eventualities. Thus a quantum state is a network of potentialities” (Shimony 1992: 
374). This was famously exemplified by Erwin Schrödinger’s thought experiment (Schrödinger 
1935, English translation by Trimmer 1980), popularly referred to as ‘Schrödinger’s cat’. 
Although the thought experiment was put forward in order to demonstrate the absurdity of 
applying quantum principles to objects or systems above the atomic level, it will be shown that 
it can be usefully adapted to the conception of the nature of conditionals without contravening 
aspects of the original. Let us first look at the description of the thought experiment (Trimmer 
1980: 327), before further explaining its relevance to the examination of the modal nature of 
conditionals. 
 
A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following device (which must be secured 
against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive 
substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of the hour one of the atoms decays, but also, 
with equal probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges and through a 
relay releases a hammer which shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this 
entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom 
has decayed. The psi-function of the entire system would express this by having in it the living 
and dead cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts. It is typical of these 
cases that an indeterminacy originally restricted to the atomic domain becomes transformed into 
macroscopic indeterminacy, which can then be resolved by direct observation.  
 
Simply put, Schrödinger’s thought experiment sought to demonstrate the absurdity of accepting 
that, while no observation is taking place, the cat in the box is simultaneously alive and dead. 
However, in natural language use, the indeterminacy described above is not uncommon, as (7) 
demonstrates (emphasis added).  
 
(7) AUTHORSHIP can be called, if anything or anyone can, dual, equivocal. The 
works of authors are replicas, and they are unique. They are and are not 




Therefore, it does not seem absurd that the factuality/actuality of P and A can be ‘in limbo’ 
pending comparison with the addressees’ knowledge, interpretations, wishes, intentions etc. – 
or, in the terms of quantum mechanics, until an observation or measurement has been made 
(see Stapp 1993: 25-26).  
 
Although Schrödinger’s thought experiment posits a single box, it essentially involves two 
component elements: the mechanism enabling the probable release of the poison, and the cat. 
The former can be seen as the content of P, the latter as the content of A. However, in the 
adaptation proposed here, the probability of the ‘release’ covers the whole spectrum, rather than 
being 50% (as in the thought experiment); that is, it may have any value between 0% and 100% 
(see Halliday 2004: 365, Gabrielatos 2010: 62-65) – depending on the additional modalisation 
of P and/or A. For example, in (8), P is additionally modalised by should and its content is, 
therefore, presented as less likely than if it was only modalised by the subordinator if. 
 
(8) If you should decide to concentrate on one particular nursing specialty then you will 
probably want to undertake a clinical nursing studies course. [CHT 248] 
 
As the mechanism posited in Schrödinger’s thought experiment “must be secured against direct 
interference by the cat” (Trimmer 1980: 327), it is compatible with both the spirit and letter of 
the experiment to posit that the two participants occupy two separate, but communicating, 
compartments within the box: that of the mechanism (protasis) and that of the cat (apodosis) – 
as shown in Figure 1 (the sequence of the compartments is irrelevant).  
 
 
Figure 1. Adaptation of the box posited in Schrödinger’s thought experiment 
 
The present adaptation allows for an opening large enough for the poison to enter the cat’s 
compartment (should it be released); however, the opening must be understood to be too small 
for the cat to have any access to the compartment housing the mechanism. A compatible 
corollary is that observers can examine not only both compartments simultaneously (as in the 
thought experiment), but also each compartment separately, by opening only the lid of the 
compartment representing the protasis or apodosis (henceforth, P-compartment and A-
compartment, respectively). The examination of each compartment symbolises the existence of 
real-world knowledge on the part of the reader/listener, that is, it represents the contextual 
elements required for interpreting the user’s intended message. It must be clarified that an 
observation of a compartment does not refer to the identification of linguistic elements and their 
surface or conventional meaning, but to contextual knowledge regarding the actuality or 
factuality of P and A. More importantly, in natural language conditionals, there are instances 





The representation of a conditional in Figure 1 above resembles a quantum bit (or qubit) – a 
concept used in quantum computation. A classical bit (currently used in computing), can only 
have one of two values, or be in one of two states (0 or 1), and, when examined, it is determined 
whether its value is 0 or 1. A qubit, however, can be in any state between, and including, 0 and 1 
(Nielsen & Chuang 2010: 13-16). Dancygirer & Sweetser (2005: 35) argue that, in natural 
language, if-conditions are interpreted as iff (i.e. if and only if), and that this entails that “hearers 
are therefore prompted to construct not one single space involving P and Q, but also an alternative 
space involving ~P and ~Q”, that is, their negation (see also Dancygier & Sweetser 2005: 36, 41, 
Fauconnier 1994: 109-127). However, Dancygier & Sweetser (2005: 110-111) concede that this 
is not always the case. Even if there is a tendency for readers/listeners to construct polar 
alternatives when interpreting conditionals, there are instances when positing a polar alternative 
seems tenuous, if not impossible – as in (9). 
 
 (9) Phaistos Disc declared as fake by scholar 
[…] 
Jerome Eisenberg, a specialist in faked ancient art, is claiming that the disc and its indecipherable 
text is not a relic dating from 1,700BC, but a forgery that has duped scholars since Luigi Pernier, 
an Italian archaeologist, “discovered” it in 1908 in the Minoan palace of Phaistos on Crete. Pernier 
was desperate to impress his colleagues with a find of his own, according to Dr Eisenberg, and 
needed to unearth something that could outdo the discoveries made by Sir Arthur Evans, the 
renowned English archaeologist, and Federico Halbherr, a fellow Italian. He believes that Pernier's 
solution was to create a “relic” with an untranslatable pictographic text.  
If it was a ruse, it worked. 
Evans was so excited that he published an analysis of Pernier's findings.  
[Times Online]4 
 
In (9), the content of A (‘it worked’) only makes sense if P holds – that is, if the Phaistos Disc 
is indeed a fake. However, if the Phaistos Disc is genuine, then there was no ruse in the first 
place. If there was no ruse, it is unwarranted to posit that ‘it [i.e. the ruse] didn’t work’. In other 
words, if we posit that in (9) P does not hold, we cannot posit that, as a result, A also does not 
hold; crucially, neither can we posit that A does hold. Rather, if P does not hold, then the content 
of A becomes irrelevant. In this light, (9) can be seen to function as a modalised (i.e. 
indeterminate) version of ‘It was a ruse that worked’.5  
 
Equally importantly, when a qubit is examined (i.e. when an observation/measurement is 
performed), its state cannot be determined with the certainty that the state of a classical bit can 
– which must be either 0 or 1. Rather, the result of a measurement of the state of a qubit is the 
respective probabilities that its state is 0 or 1 (Nielsen & Chuang 2010: 13-16). The latter is 
perfectly compatible with natural language conditionals, as example (10) demonstrates (see also 
(2) and (8) above).  
 
(10) “Besides, if I blow this open, they just might notice,” she finished dryly. [FSR 2256] 
 
In (10), the actualisation of P does not ensure the actualisation of A; it only indicates the degree 
of likelihood of its actualisation. In the context of Schrödinger’s thought experiment, as adapted 
here, the release of the poison will not necessarily result in the observation of a dead cat, but in 
the probability that the cat is alive/dead. Of course, in natural language, this probability is not 
usually specified numerically, but in a rather vague manner through modal marking (e.g. might, 
 
4 ‘Phaistos Disc declared as fake by scholar’, 12 July 2008,  
http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/visual_arts/article4318911.ece  
5 It is not lost on the writer that the argument in this paragraph is realised as a chain of conditionals. 
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chances are, seems possible that) (see Channell 1994: 53, 83-87, Jucker et al. 2003, Nuyts 2001: 
22). In the context of the visual depiction in Figure 1, the above considerations entail that 
looking into one compartment may not furnish conclusive information about the content of the 
other, but, at best, only clues. More importantly, Gabrielatos (2010: 270) found that in more 
than one-third (35.3%) of if-conditionals the apodosis does not express an epistemic notion (e.g. 
a prediction or inference), that is, something that could be factually checked, but deontic or 
volitional notions (e.g. a suggestion or wish). In such cases, the observation in the A-
compartment cannot provide information/clues regarding the factuality of actualisation of the 
content of A. The above will be discussed in detail in Section 4.  
 
4. Conditionals as qubits: their function in discourse 
 
This section will examine instances of the types of conditionals recognised in Gabrielatos 
(2010), in order to demonstrate how approaching conditionals as linguistic qubits, visually 
represented by the box in Schrödinger’s thought experiment (as adapted here), provides insights 
into the nature of conditionals.6 What will become clear through the discussion of different 
examples is that  
 
a) the interpretation of different types of conditionals hinges on observing the P or A 
compartment;  
b) the observation of the P and/or A compartment, and the establishment of facts (e.g. 
whether P or A holds), is not always necessary or, more importantly, may not be 
intended by the speaker/writer. 
c) observations may result in a binary resolution (e.g. P holds or does not hold), but they 
may also result in intermediate or indeterminate resolutions (e.g. P probably holds), or, 
more interestingly, positing a polar alternative may not be warranted. 
d) the assessment of likelihood described in (c) may not be provided directly, through 
marking for epistemic modality, but indirectly, through conventional (i.e. context-
independent) or conversational (i.e. context-dependent) implicatures invited through the 
use of modal marking. 
 
4.1 Classification of conditionals 
 
The classification of conditionals in Gabrielatos (2010: 230-265) reflects their bipartite 
constructional nature: each conditional is classified according to the nature of the link between 
P and A (henceforth, P-A link), and the modal function of the construction.7 Regarding the P-
A link, the typology adopts the core distinction between direct and indirect conditions proposed 
in Quirk et al. (1985: 1088-1097). In direct conditionals (DIR), the realisation of the content of 
A – that is, the action, situation, or notion expressed in A – depends on the realisation, actuality 
or factuality of the content of P. For example, in (11), the encouragement in A is directly 
contingent on the falsifiability specified in P. That is, if the criterion of falsifiability is not met, 
then the encouragement does not stand. In indirect conditionals (IND), what is contingent on P 
is not the content of A, but the relevance of its uttering, or the wording or clarity of its content. 
For example, in (12), what is contingent on the need specified in P is the relevance of the 
question in A – if the need does not arise, the question is moot. The difference in the semantic 
link between DIR and IND is mirrored in the syntactic role of A: an adjunct in DIR, but a 
disjunct in IND (Quirk et al. 1985: 612-631, 1072).  
 
6 Please note that the sequence of the two components will not always be P-A (as in Figure 1), but may also be A-
P, depending on the sequence in each example.  
7 For a critical discussion of other classifications, see Gabrielatos (2010: 152-188). 
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(11) Rash speculations are to be encouraged, provided they are falsifiable [FBE 733].  
 
(12) If you need a replacement lock, will the locksmith fit the best quality equipment? 
[CCY 1191] 
 
The classification of conditionals according to the modal function of the construction is in line 
with studies showing that conditional constructions are closely related to modality (Gabrielatos 
2010: 189-229, 2011, 2013, 2019). In this dimension, four types of conditionals are recognised, 
as the apodosis of each expresses one of the four modality types recognised in Gabrielatos 
(2010: 134-147), which is a more fine-grained adaptation of the binary classification posited in 
Quirk et al. (1985: 219-239).   
 
Attitude to Likelihood (LK). This type encompasses assessments of actuality, factuality, truth, 
possibility, likelihood, or probability. Seen from a different angle, it comprises the expression 
of knowledge, belief, inference, hypothesis, guess, prediction, or speculation. These notions are 
not treated as discrete, but are seen as overlapping. For example, a prediction can be made on 
the basis of observation (or inferences based on observation), or belief, or be a mere guess. In 
turn, belief and knowledge refer to a person’s attitude towards actuality, in that the fact that a 
person ‘knows’ something does not necessarily entail that this putative knowledge corresponds 
to reality. For example, (13) functions as a conditional prediction. 
 
(13)   Supposing we had grown to know and love nuclear power (as the French seem to),  
would we now be seeing it expanding rapidly from what the International Atomic 
Energy Agency claims is its present provision of 16 per cent of the world's 
electricity to 25 per cent or more? [AB6786]  
 
Attitude to Propensity (PP). This type involves judgements about ability, capability, skills, 
aptitude, feasibility,  potentiality, tendency, or propensity, as they relate to animate or inanimate 
entities, concepts, states, processes, or relations. This type is closely related to LK, in that 
assessments of likelihood may be based on inherent properties (Palmer 1990: 38, Quirk et al. 
1985: 221-222). However, PP is distinct from LK, in that the speaker stops at expressing his/her 
attitude to the existence of the above properties – any inferences regarding the likelihood of 
actualisation are the prerogative of the listener/reader. For example, (14) expresses conditional 
potentiality. 
 
(14)  Often wall mounted in or near the working area they can be a useful provision 
 provided they are kept clean, emptied after use and operating temperatures are 
maintained. [APV377] 
 
Attitude to Desirability: Directed (DD) and Non-Directed (DN). The final two types are also 
related, as they both express the way that the speaker would like states of affairs to have been 
in the past, or be in the present or future. However, attitude to desirability may manifest itself 
in two ways. On the one hand, speakers may actively seek to have their desires implemented, 
by attempting to directly manipulate the action of others (or even their own) through the use of 
language. The notions communicated in this way are those of obligation, duty, requirement, 
promise, advice, suggestion, invitation, prohibition, or permission. This type of modality is 
termed directed desirability (DD). On the other hand, speakers may opt to use indirect ways in 
trying to have their desires implemented. They may, superficially, merely express what states 
of affairs they would like to see materialising, or how they would like an existing state of affairs 
to develop, without any explicit attempt to influence, through linguistic means, the thinking or 
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behaviour of others (or themselves) to that direction. This involves the expression of such 
notions as volition, intention, willingness, wish, hope, desire or need. This type is termed non-
directed desirability (DN). For example, (15) expresses a conditional strong suggestion, and 
(16) expresses a conditional volition. 
 
(15)  Supposing, for simplicity, we are concerned only with two years, price this year 
should be determined by short-run marginal cost (a view not endorsed by the 1967 
White Paper - see section 4.4), but investment plans for next year should be 
evaluated (using net present value methods) based upon long-run marginal costs. 
[EX21132] 
 
(16)   She explained that she wanted someone outside her family to know about them in  
case anything should happen to her before she would be able to raise the issue with 
someone with influence in Northern Ireland. [CCC546] 
 
The above classification is informed by, and compatible with, all other major classifications of 
modality, in that the types it posits can be combined to form types recognised in them (Table 1, 
adapted from Gabrielatos 2010: 142). All four types share the core notion of uncertainty – 
expressed as distance from knowledge, actuality or actualisation (for a detailed discussion, see 
Gabrielatos 2010: 55-151, forthcoming).  
 








Extrinsic Intrinsic Quirk et al. (1985) 
Epistemic Non-Epistemic (Root) Coates (1983) 
Epistemic Agent/Speaker-Oriented Bybee et al. (1994) 
Modalization Modularity Halliday (2004) 
Logical Personal Biber et al. (1999) 
Epistemic Dynamic Deontic Palmer (1986, 1990) 
 
4.2 DIR-LK inferential conditionals 
 
In this type, the apodosis expresses an inference based on the clues/premises provided in the 
protasis. Example (17) is a seemingly straightforward case of the speaker inviting the listener 
to draw inferences based on the content of P and A.  
 
(17) The facts speak for themselves;  
if Dana had any feelings for you 
she’d have refused my offer.  
[H8J 2736] 
 
More specifically, in (17), establishing the factuality of A (i.e. whether Dana refused the offer) 
leads to inferences regarding her feelings. In this case, the modal marking in A (would + perfect 
infinitive) provides strong linguistic clues for working out the conventional implicature that A 
is non-factual (Comrie 1986: 89, Quirk et al. 1985: 110), which, in turn, invites the inference 
that Dana does not have feelings for him. However, this inferencing process is the only 
straightforward aspect of (17). It would be misinterpreting (and underestimating) the function 
of (17) to say that it merely invites an inference. Rather, it is argued that its primary function is 
to express the statement ‘Dana doesn’t have feelings for you’ in a tentative (i.e. modal) manner. 
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In this light, the inferential function is a means to an end, as it provides the reasoning on which 
the tentative statement is based.  
 
Example (18) is less straightforward and, hence, more interesting – as well as being indicative 
of the modal nature of conditionals.  
 
(18) But the shadows that were deepening over Europe were reaching out to "change 
everything" in lives across the world, and the Burrows family were to be no 
exception. The house they lived in belonged to a German lady, a Miss Wacker, who 
had been home in her own country when war broke out and was unable to return. The 
night war was declared Mrs Burrows broke down in tears. Joyce tried to comfort her, 
assuring her that none of the boys would have to go. Of course they did. They even 
put their ages forward by a year, unknown to their parents, when they enlisted. 
Beverley became a major in an armoured tank division, Walter served with 
distinction and held officer rank in both the air force and the infantry, Robert 
Bramwell had a commission in the anti-tank corps. Both he and Walter saw service 
in New Guinea, suffered extreme malaria attacks and were wounded and 
hospitalised. The fourth and youngest boy, Bramwell Orams, was in the air force 
from the age of seventeen and flew on many sorties in the Pacific war zone. 
 If the sisters' husbands are 
included  
there were seven men from the family in 
action, some in the thickest part of the 
New Guinea campaign. [H7E 383] 
 
In (18), the actual number of “men from the family in action” remains undetermined, pending 
the decision to include/exclude the sisters’ husbands from the calculation – with the decision 
hinging on whether they are deemed to be members of the family. In the context of the box 
(Figure 1 above), this would entail looking into the P compartment. Whatever the observation, 
the reader is invited to draw straightforward inferences (by performing simple calculations); 
that is, the number of “men from the family in action” is either seven or seven minus the number 
of the sisters’ husbands. The latter is given in the sentence preceding the conditional. In that 
respect, (18) is an inferential conditional. However, there are two points to be made. The least 
important one is that the resolution of P may be useful in drawing this inference, as this is not 
necessary: even lacking the knowledge of the number of the sisters’ husbands, the reader can 
draw the inference, ‘There were up to seven men from the family in action’. The important 
point is that treating (18) as merely providing the clues for an inference would under-represent 
its function. The co-text clearly suggests that the inference is not invited. More precisely, the 
co-text points to the interpretation that the function of (18) is not to provide clues in P and A, 
which, combined, will result in the accurate or approximate calculation of the number of ‘men 
from the family’ that had gone to fight in the war (depending on the addressee’s knowledge or 
point of view regarding inclusion in the family). Rather, it is to convey in a tentative manner 
(by employing the indeterminacy of a conditional construction) that their number is regarded 
as being large. More precisely, this is achieved by the unmodalised mention of the number 
seven in A, assigning the modalising effect to P – that is, leaving it up to the reader to decide 
whether to utilise the condition in P (i.e. whether to carry out an observation in the P 
compartment) in order to calculate that seven constitutes an upper limit, or to focus on the 
number in A. 
 
4.3 DIR and IND rhetorical conditionals 
 
Rhetorical conditionals can be seen as the inverse of inferential conditionals, in that the 
addresser does not express the inference, but invites the addressee to draw inferences on the 
basis of linguistic elements in P, and can be DIR or IND (Gabrielatos 2010: 258-259, Quirk et 
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al. 1985: 1094-1095). Here we will examine two types of rhetorical conditionals: a 
straightforward case of a DIR with an affirmative A, and one of an IND with an interrogative 
A. In (19), the observation of the clear absurdity of A (as a desire cannot be ‘nothing’) invites 
the strong inference that, as far as the speaker is concerned, P does not hold – i.e. the desire is 
indeed self-deceiving.  
 
(19) As he spoke, Deems rose, clutching the MPRP weapon. ‘I prefer my cynicism to your self-
deceiving optimism.’ ‘Ibrox, my party wishes merely to see an end to conflict. We desire to 
finish with galactic war for ever. Is that self-deceiving?’  
 It is nothing if not self-deceiving 
 
It must be noted that rhetorical conditionals have a lot in common with “epistemic conditionals” 
(Sweetser 1990: 116-117), as in both cases, inference is involved (Gabrielatos 2010: 176, see 
also Palmer 1990: 175). A subtler type of rhetorical conditional is IND with a rhetorical 
question in A, as in (20). 
 
(20) If the Manic Street 
Preachers are so 
Jonathan-Kinging radical 
why don't they go round Channel 4 and kick Terry 
Christian's smug, ugly, homophobic face in and 
then cut Amanda De Torybimbo's Barbie-doll head 
off with a rusty cake slice? [CAD 3339] 
 
One interpretation of the rhetorical mechanism in (20) is that the listener, by looking into A, 
that is, by utilising the knowledge that the situation in A has not happened or is unlikely to 
happen (knowledge which is assumed by the speaker to be available), reaches the conclusion 
that the Manic Street Preachers are not radical. However, it is not necessary to have this 
knowledge – that is, in the context of the thought experiment, it is not necessary to carry out an 
observation. Similarly to (19), it is the extremely low likelihood that the actions described in A 
have been, or would be, carried out that leads to the inference that the speaker wants to 
communicate that P does not hold. However, even if the action were deemed likely, the fact 
that it is expressed as a ‘why not’ question invites the inference that it was not carried out.  
 
4.4 DIR-LK polar conditionals 
 
Polar conditionals combine characteristics of inferential and rhetorical conditionals, as A 
specifies one of two alternatives presented as polar extremes in the context, representing the 
minimum or maximum likely alternative (Gabrielatos 2010: 254-259). In (21), P and A each 
propose an alternative stance towards educational practices: “partial approach to reason” in A, 
or “sheer irrationality” in P.  
 
(21) The consequence is that reason in modern society has been reduced in scope to a means-end form: 
debate is too often a technical discussion among experts about the means. The ends are seldom 
on the agenda for serious debate, for society is unable to handle that kind of discussion. We see 
precisely this happening in higher education. Discourse about higher education focuses on 
structure, finance, numbers and performance indicators: it is about means, method and systems 
for planning and resource allocation. The values or ends for which higher education stands are 
seldom raised as a serious matter for discussion.  
 What appears on the surface as a 
reasoned form of life is in reality a mask 
for a partial approach to reason,  
if not sheer irrationality.  




This seems to entail that both compartments need to be observed, with the expectation being 
that one of the two alternatives will be chosen (according to the reader’s views). However, this 
interpretation would misrepresent the function of (21), diminishing it to merely offering a 
binary choice. On the contrary, (21) is not simply an alternative linguistic realisation of ‘This 
is either a partial approach to reason, or sheer irrationality’. Granted, A and P, respectively, 
only specify the weakest and strongest stance that the speaker proposes (the 0 and 1 values in a 
qubit). However, by virtue of being a conditional construction (a linguistic qubit), (21) also 
allows for the activation of intermediate alternatives. More importantly, these intermediate 
alternatives need not be specified by the reader, nor need they be specifiable. Simply put, the 




As was mentioned in Section 3, more than one-third of if-conditionals have PP, DD, or DN 
functions (e.g. express conditional ability, obligation, or volition), and, therefore, the 
actualisation of the content of A cannot be empirically established (Gabrielatos 2010: 270). 
Example (22) further demonstrates the indeterminate nature of conditionals, while also 
supporting the premise that the truth or factuality of P does not necessarily entail the factuality 
of A (see also Dancygier 1998: 14-19).  
 
(22) If you don't go away, I will call the police. [BN3 471] 
 
A first observation is that, as long as the issue of whether the addressee goes away is unresolved, 
it will also be unresolved whether the speaker calls the police. However, this approach is 
misleading, as A is marked for DN  ̶  that is, what is presented as contingent on the addressee 
failing to go away is not an action, but the intention of an action. In other words, even without 
the modalising influence of P, the content of A is not factual, but a future intention (i.e. 
indeterminate). Therefore, there is nothing in (22) that ensures a cause-effect relation between 
P and A. For example, there is nothing to prevent the speaker from calling the police even if 
the addressee does go away. More importantly, in real time, an observation of the P-
compartment cannot resolve whether the listener went away (as it lies in the future). What can 
be resolved is whether the listener believes that the intention will be carried out. Seen form a 
different angle, even if we accept an observation that does resolve whether the listener went 
away, this putative resolution of P cannot be used to draw inferences regarding the actual action 
of the speaker – only regarding the speaker’s intention. Therefore, although, superficially, the 
conditional in (22) expresses a cause-effect relation, it functions, due to its indeterminate nature, 
as a more forceful version of ‘Go away’ – or, more accurately, a version of ‘Go away, or else’, 




In some conditionals, the marking of uncertainty in P does not reflect the speaker’s assessment 
of the truth/actuality/factuality of its content, as is exemplified by (23). 
 
(23) Going Back to Work  
Now that you've thought long and hard about goals and objectives, let's get back to the nitty-gritty 
of finding and getting a job. 
 If you are going to work for 
somebody else, 
then you'll need to prepare a record of your 




On the surface, as long as no observation in P takes place, that is, as long as the issue of the 
reader’s intention/plan regarding working for somebody else remains unresolved, it also 
remains unresolved whether the reader will need to prepare a record of his/her abilities and 
experience. However, as the immediate co-text indicates, and the wider co-text reveals, (23) is 
part of a text providing advice on finding employment (not on becoming self-employed or 
starting a business).8 Therefore, both writer and reader know that P is factual (i.e. the 
observation has already been made), at least in the context of the text’s focus. This gives rise to 
the question of why the writer opted to express the content of P as a condition under which A 
becomes relevant, or, more precisely, why A is presented as if it were unresolved, when, in fact, 
it is “contextually given” (Dancygier 1998: 111-116). The answer, it is argued, is that, by 
providing the advice within a conditional construction, the writer employs its indeterminate 
nature to communicate the advice in a more tentative (and, therefore, potentially polite) fashion.  
 
4.7 IND pretext conditionals 
 
In pretext IND conditionals (Gabrielatos 2010: 247-252), the content of A is only superficially 
dependent on the content of P; that is, P functions as a pretext for uttering A. In this type, P 
appears to provide the addressee with a choice (Dancygier 1998: 90), but this choice amounts 
only to the addressee having the option to disregard the content of A as irrelevant if they deem 
that P does not hold, as the information in A has already been communicated regardless of the 
factuality/actualisation of P. For example, in (24), the speaker’s comment on his/her father’s 
character is expressed regardless of whether the addressee is interested in the information. 
 
(24) It was never like this, and 
 my father was an Old Bastard if you must know. [EDJ 2007] 
 
In light of the Schrödinger’s Cat metaphor, in (24), the lid of the A-compartment is open from 
the start; the observation of the P-compartment provides the additional information that the 
content of A must be seen as being expressed tentatively. This is because, by being expressed 
within a pretext conditional, the speech act in A is presented as cancellable (see Levinson 1983: 
118-120), in that the activation of the speech act is only superficially presented as depending 
on P holding. However, it must be stressed that, in pretext conditionals, P is anything but surplus 
to the interaction. It is exactly because of the existence of P that the strong negative opinion in 
A is not presented as being initiated by the speaker, but as a response to a hypothetical request 
by the listener, and therefore, as a mitigated (modalised) version of the content of A. 
 
4.8 Conditionals without apodosis 
 
When a conditional lacks an A, it is not possible to assign a semantic function to the 
construction, as it is incomplete (Gabrielatos 2010: 234-235). To express it in terms of the 
analogy with Schrödinger’s thought experiment, the cat compartment is unobservable. 
However, this is not to say that A-less conditionals lack conventionalised pragmatic functions. 
Let us examine (25). 
 
 
8 In the text, advice on writing a CV is followed by advice on acquiring references and developing interview 
techniques; no advice on becoming self-employed is given. 
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(25) ‘Forgive me, Fu Jen, but have you a reserved ticket for that seat?’  
 
She turned, straightening up, then held out her ticket for inspection, looking the man up and down 
as she did so. He was a squat, broad-shouldered Han with one of those hard, anonymous faces some 
of them had. She knew what he was at once. One of those minor officials who gloried in their 
pettiness.  
 
He made a great pretence of studying her ticket, turning it over, then turning it back. His eyes 
flicked up to her face, then took in her clothes, her lack of jewellery, before returning to her face 
again — the disdain in them barely masked. He shook his head.  
 ‘If you would follow me, Fu Jen … ’ [GUG 975 ] NO APODOSIS 
 He turned, making his way back down the aisle towards the cramped third and fourth-class seats at 
the tail of the rocket, but she stood where she was, her stomach tightening, anticipating the tussle 
to come.  
 
Realising that she wasn't following him, he came back, his whole manner suddenly, quite brutally 
antagonistic.  
 
‘You must come, Fu Jen. These seats are reserved for others.’  
 
Superficially, (25) is incomplete, as there is no information regarding the event/state/action etc. 
that would be expected to be contingent on P holding (as a conditional construction has been 
utilised). In the context of the thought experiment, the A-compartment is unobservable. The 
listener must infer the intended content of A by utilising the content of P, as well as co-textual 
and (available or inferable) contextual clues. In the specific context, Fu Jen following the 
speaker can only result in her moving to a different seat. Therefore, the lack of an A leads to 
the contextual interpretation of (25) as a polite request. The politeness also hinges on two 
complementary modal markings:  
 
a. The speaker cages the request within a protasis – i.e. a construction already marked for 
LK modality, which adds “modal remoteness” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 147-149, 
173, Lyons 1977: 820, see also Perkins 1983: 107-108); in turn, the modal remoteness 
“adds politeness to utterances” (Quirk et al. 1985: 1097). 
b.  The protasis is, additionally, marked for DN modality – i.e. it superficially presents the 
action as contingent on the listener’s volition.  
 
This interpretation is supported by the repetition of the request in the last line of (25) (indicated 
by underline), but, this time, with politeness removed. This is shown by the use of DD modality, 
and the absence of any explicit politeness markers (e.g. please). 
 
The discussion in this section has provided evidence supporting the conception of conditional 
constructions as linguistic qubits, in that their utility lies in their leaving the issue of 
actuality/actualisation unresolved. Even otherwise unmodalised conditionals present their 
content as being tentative/indeterminate – even if this is at a very small degree. Expressed from 
the perspective of modality, conditionals are constructions which modalise what is 
communicated through them.  
 
5. Defining the family of conditional constructions 
 
The conception of conditionals as linguistic qubits, in conjunction with their ML patterns (as 
identified in Gabrielatos 2010, 2019), have implications for the notion of construction family 
(Goldberg & Jackendoff 2004: 535-536). Constructions are seen to belong to a family if they 
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share similarities in their function and/or form (Bergs 2008: 181, Fujii 2004: 127, Hudson 2008: 
259). The discussion so far has focused on three characteristics that signal constructional family 
resemblance and, therefore, sanction inclusion of a construction in the family of conditionals:  
 
• The construction is bipartite, consisting of a protasis and an apodosis.  
• In the protasis, a condition is expressed; in the apodosis, a comment related to the 
condition in the protasis is provided. 
• The construction is an environment of indeterminacy, functioning as the linguistic 
equivalent of a qubit.  
 
Indications regarding the characteristics differentiating between members of the family of 
conditional constructions were provided in Gabrielatos (2010, 2019, forthcoming), where 
differences in both the ML and the frequency of different modality types were observed in 
conditionals with different subordinators, as well as the protases and apodoses of DIR and IND 
conditionals. At the same time, it was observed that the P-A link and the semantic function of 
the conditional interact to produce different types and sub-types, and that there are differences 
in the patterns of modal load and/or type of modal marking between sub-types of the same type. 
In light of the discussion so far, different members of the family of conditionals can be 
differentiated on the basis of the following characteristics and their permutations. 
 
• The particular subordinator.  
• The nature of the P-A link (DIR or IND) and the different subtypes of IND. 
• The modal function of the conditional construction (LK, PP, DD, DN). 
 
However, the above similarities and differences do not provide the full picture. The remainder 
of this section will, therefore, discuss further constructional characteristics that sanction 
inclusion in the family of conditionals, as well characteristics that differentiate between family 
members.  
 
It was hypothesised in Section 2 that the indeterminate nature of protases is expected to be 
formally marked. Expressed more forcefully, the hypothesis is that protases are always 
modalised – that is, obligatory modalisation of P is a defining characteristic of the family of 
conditionals. It must, however, be clarified from the outset that the claim concerns conditionals 
in English, as studies have indicated that the permanent modalisation of P is not a universal 
characteristic. For example, this seems to be the case in Japanese (Fujii 2004), but not in 
German (Hilpert 2010). In the vast majority of English conditionals, P is modalised via a 
subordinator (Gabrielatos 2010: 45-49). However, for the hypothesis to hold, we need to 
establish that even conditionals without a subordinator have permanently modalised protases. 
To this end we will examine examples of bipartite constructions lacking a subordinator which 
have been (tentatively) presented as being conditional (Dancygier 1998: 188-194, Fillmore 
1986: 169, 1990: 140-141). Fillmore (1990: 141) presents these constructions as “other ways 
of identifying alternative worlds”.  
 
The first category comprises conditionals in which P and A are linked by subordination, but 
this syntactic link is “marked by subject-verb inversion” (Dancygier 1998: 192-193), as in (26) 
and (27).  
 
(26) Should you change your mind, let us know. 
  




Inversion in P can itself be seen as a modal marker, as it is syntactically related to questions, 
which are non-assertive (Dancygier 1998: 192, Gabrielatos 2010: 118-124, Hilpert 2010). 
However, it seems that, in such conditionals, P is modally marked irrespective of (or in addition 
to) the inversion: should in (26) and the past perfect in (27) – the latter marking modal 
remoteness twice: via the combination of the past tense and the perfect aspect (Huddleston & 
Pullum 2002: 150). That is, the inversion involves a modal marker. Of course, an empirical 
examination of corpus samples of instances of non-interrogative inversions is needed to verify 
if this always the case. 
 
The second category comprises conditionals in which P and A are linked by coordination, and 
P is modally marked by the imperative (i.e. it is marked with DD modality), such as (28) and 
(29) below.  
 
(28) Open the window and/or I’ll kill you. 
  
(29) Criticize him the slightest bit and he starts crying. 
 
What is interesting with such conditionals is that “it is not immediately obvious how the 
conditional use of the [imperative] form is related to its more typical directive use” (Fortuin & 
Boogaart 2009: 642). This incongruity has led to terming constructions like (28) and (29) as 
“imperative-like conditionals” (Dancygier 1998: 188) and “pseudo-commands” (Fillmore 
1990: 141). The incongruity can be resolved in light of the discussion so far, in that that the 
indeterminate nature of the conditional construction leads to interpreting the imperative (a 
construction that normally expresses directives) as expressing conditionality, but with the added 
pragmatic force (Leech 1983: 17) of a challenge or threat issued by the speaker to the listener.   
 
Similar to imperative-like conditionals are a) constructions in which the speaker offers to 
perform an action in return for the listener performing another action, as in (30), and b) so much 
as constructions, such as (31) (Dancygier & Sweetser 2005: 244). 
 
(30) You clear the table and I’ll do the dishes. 
  
(31) You so much as take another step and I’ll shoot. 
 
In (30) and (31), clear and take cannot be interpreted as habitual (i.e. as being present simple 
forms). Therefore, both being morphologically unmarked, the alternatives are that they are 
either imperative or present subjunctive forms – both marking modality. More specifically, they 
are imperatives in which the word you is “contrastive in the sense of addressee-distinguishing” 
(Quirk, et al. 1985: 828). 
 
However, there are also constructions which have been presented as candidates for being 
conditional, but which do not seem to have modally marked protases – such as (32)-(35) below 
(Dancygier & Sweetser 2005: 237-268, Fillmore, 1986: 169, 1990: 141, Goldberg & Casenhiser 
2006: 345).  
 
(32) A little bit closer and we’re dead. 
  




(34) Anyone who does that gets what he deserves. 
  
(35) The more chips you eat, the more you want. 
 
It could be argued that, in (32) and (33) above, the lack of modal marking in P is due to the verb 
phrase being elided – and that, in both cases, the first clause can only be understood as the 
protasis of a conditional construction (e.g. ‘If we move a bit closer’; ‘If he puts his hat on’). 
However, (33) can be better seen as comprising only one clause, in which ‘with his hat on’ 
functions as an adjunct, and, therefore, cannot be a conditional, as it is not bipartite. Also, in 
(34) and (35), an elided modalisation in P cannot be posited, as in both cases, the lexical verb 
is in the present tense, and, therefore, clearly unmodalised. That is, it seems uncontroversial 
that (34) and (35) can be more accurately paraphrased by a when(ever)-construction, rather than 
a conditional and are, therefore, not conditional constructions. Therefore, it is claimed that for 
a bipartite construction to be deemed a conditional it needs, among other characteristics, to have 
an obligatorily modalised protasis. The claim is tentative, as it would need to be also examined 
using experimental and/or elicited introspective data (for example, see Hollmann & Siewierska 
2006) – something that is beyond the scope of this chapter. A related hypothesis is that 
conditionals in which P and A are linked by co-ordination cannot be IND. The hypothesis stems 
from the protasis of IND being a “disjunct”, that is, linked to A by subordination (Quirk et al. 
1985: 615). Of course an empirical study of conditionals such as (32)-(35) is needed to 
investigate this hypothesis. 
 
In light of the discussion in this chapter, we can posit five characteristics distinguishing the 
family of conditional constructions from other families, with the fifth characteristic being 
tentative, pending further research.  
 
a. The construction is bipartite, consisting of the protasis and apodosis.  
b. The protasis modalises the apodosis. 
c. The apodosis depends on the protasis for its factuality, actuality, realisation, activation, 
or relevance. 
d. Conditional constructions are environments of indeterminacy, functioning as the 
linguistic equivalent of a qubit.  
e. The protasis is obligatorily modalised (lexically and/or grammatically). 
 
When examining the differences between members of the family of conditionals, we need to 
take into account that P and A may be linked by subordination (e.g. if, unless) or co-ordination 
(e.g. and, or). In the case of subordination, P is modally marked lexically by the subordinator 
(e.g. assuming), or grammatically, through past tense marking plus inversion, or through the 
use of a modal verb (e.g. should) plus inversion. In the case of co-ordination, P is modally 
marked grammatically, through the imperative. Therefore, the characteristics differentiating 
between members of the family of conditional constructions are as follows: 
 
a. The syntactic nature of the P-A link: subordination or co-ordination. 
b. The semantic nature of the P-A link (DIR or IND). 
c. In the case of subordination, the respective syntactic role of A in DIR (adjunct) and 
IND (disjunct). 
d. The semantic function of the conditional (determined by the modal marking of A). 
e. The subtype of DIR or IND. 
f. The particular modal marker of the protasis (subordinator, past tense, or modal plus 




All six characteristics will be specified in the attributes of the respective construction. The 
syntactic component will specify whether P and A are linked through subordination or co-
ordination, as well as the syntactic role of A. In subordinate linkage, the modal marker of P will 
be specified in the lexical and/or morphological and/or syntactic components. In co-ordinate 
linkage, the modal marking (imperative) will be specified in the morphological and syntactic 
components. The semantic component will specify the type(s) of modality marked in the 
protasis and the apodosis. In fact, if the hypothesis of obligatory modalisation in P holds, then 
the semantic component of P will permanently specify LK modalisation, while allowing for the 
additional marking of other modality types. The pragmatic component will specify the (range 




It was shown that conditional constructions are linguistic environments of indeterminacy, in 
that the factuality, actuality, or actualisation of the content of both protasis and apodosis is 
indeterminate. Expressed from the perspective of modality, conditionals are constructions 
which modalise what is communicated through them. Also, in the vast majority of conditionals, 
even if the protasis holds, the apodosis only specifies (vaguely) the likelihood of its actuality or 
actualisation, or communicates other modal notions such ability, obligation, or volition – all 
sharing the core concept of uncertainty. In this light, conditionals can be usefully regarded as 
linguistic qubits. More importantly, it was shown that the utility of conditional constructions 
does not lie in their indeterminacy being resolved, but in the implicatures that their 
indeterminate nature invites, and the resulting wealth of communicative functions that 
conditionals can perform. The types of communicative functions are determined by the type of 
conditional that is utilised, in combination with the relevant co-text and the available or 
contextually inferable context. The chapter also discussed the characteristics defining 
conditionals as a constructional family (and differentiating them from other bipartite 
constructions), as well as the multiple dimensions differentiating between members of the 
family of conditionals. Finally, this chapter tentatively posited that one of the defining 
characteristics of conditional constructions is that their protases are obligatorily modalised. The 
investigation of this claim is expected to shed further light not only into the nature of 
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